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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
IN CASE NO. 11174

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Respondent in Case No. 11174 concurs with
both the State of Utah and Salt Lake City as to the nature of the case.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Likewise, this Plaintiff-Respondent concurs with the
statements of the other parties concerning the disposition
in the lower court.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Thi,s Plaintiff-Respondent seeks the same relief as
that sought in the companion case by the appeal of the
State of Utah and to have reversed the decision of the
trial Judge as it pertains to upholding the validity of the
ordinance in Case No. 11174. At the same time, this Plaintiff-Re·spondent seeks to have upheld those portions of
the deci.,sion of the trial Judge in Case No. 1117 4 which
deny entry to private clubs by peace officers except
through the process of lawful search warrants.
To the end that thi·s Plaintiff-Respondent seeks the
same relief in the Supreme Oourt as does the State of
Utah, this Plaintiff-Respondent ooncurs with the points
raised by the State of Utah in its brief without reiterating those points or argument herein, except as may be
·supplemented by the points hereinafter raised.

iSTATEMENT OF FACTS
This Plaintiff-Respondent concurs with both the
State of Utah and Salt Lake City as to the statements of
fact in their respective briefs.
2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
TO SUSrrAIN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION \YOULD BE TO
SUPPORT "LEFT-HANDED PROHIBITION" IN
CONTRAVENTION OF STATE LAW.
Salt Lake City would appear, in Point V of its brief,
to argue that it can enact an ordinance "regulating"
private clubs that is just as tough as its Commission may
choose when it infers that such clubs must be willing to
accept the conditions (query: any conditions, even if they
are confiscatory~) that are imposed upon them.
Counsel for Salt Lake City exposed that position
even more fluently before the trial Court. In effect, counsel stated that Salt Lake City can make the rules as strict
as it wants for private clubs and if these State-franchised clubs don't like Salt Lake City's rules they can
move out to some other political subdivision.
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that such is not
the law.
In 1960, Salt Lake County attempted to tell the State
Liquor Control ~mmission where it could and could not
establish retail liquor stores and agencies. Not so, said
this Court (Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Commission, 11 Utah 2d 235, 357 P.2d 488).
This Court pronounced, at page 490: "If an ordinance ipso facto could render impotent the enactment
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giving the Liquor Contrnl Commission this authority (to
locate liquor stores and package agencies), unincorporated areas in counties could enjoy a sort of local option
ais to liquor sales and consumption that neighboring ones
would not enjoy, and a sort of left-handed Prohibition
created by a process of exclusion by ordinance,-a result,
we are satisfied, which was not intended by the Liquor
Control Act.''
How relatively simple to paraphrase this pronouncement ·of thi1s Court to fit the instant cases: "If an ordinance ipso facto could render impotent the enactment
giving the Secretary of State this authority (to franchise
and regulate private clubs wherein intoxicating liquor is
permitted to be stored and served), Salt Lake City could
enjoy a sort of local option as to liquor storage and consumption that neighboring ones would not enjoy, and a
sort of left-handed Prohibition created by a proces.s of
exclusion by ordinance,-a result, we are satisfied, which
was not intended by the Liquor-Locker Club Act.''
In enacting 11-10-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the
Legislature very advisedly chose the mandatory expression "shall license" rather than the permissive "may
license" and excluded any authority to regulate in order
that they prev·ent any of this "left-handed Prohibition"
which this Court akeady has found offensive.
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the import
sought by Salt Lake City to be given to 11-10-1 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 would require a recognition by this Court
that "left-handed Prohibition" is not as offensive as it
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was found in the !Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control
Oommission case, supra.

POINT II
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS
GUARANTEED BY BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE SAFE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
Section 7 of the Ordinance provides, in part: '' ... if
entrance to the premise·s or facilities of the club is only
by use of a key or other device then a key or such device
must be supplied to the chief of police, ... ".
Section 14 provides, in part: "All peace officel"s are
given the express right to confiscate without the prior
issuance of a writ or warrant ... , any liquor ... which
(are) stored on the premises of club that is not properly
labeled as to ownership or stored in a member's locker
and to which no one claims title."
Section 20 provides : ''Any peace officer shall have
the right to enter the club room, meeting rooms, premises
and facilities of non-profit clubs for the purpose of determining whether any laws or ordinances are being violated therein and in the case of clubs holding Class "B"
or Class '' C '' licenses, the police department shall make
periodic inspections of said premises and report its findings to the Board of Commissioners.''
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Section 23 provides, in part: ''Licenses may be suspended 1or revoked by the Board of Comrnis·sioners for
the violation of any provision of this title or any other
applicable ordinance or law relating to alcoholic beverages .... ".
Thus, reading these provisions together any peace
offioer (he doesn't have to be a Salt Lake City policeman) could enter the premises of any club in Salt Lake
City, either with the key provided the chief of police or
otherwise, could confiscate liquor, gather other evidence
and report it back to the board of commissioners who, in
turn, could revoke the club's license without a hearing.
All ·of thi,s, Salt Lake City would have us believe, could
be done without any warrant of any sort.
By what authority, either divine or otherv,-ise, does
Salt Lake City claim this right 7 According to its brief,
Point V, because Salt Lake City is granting free citizens
the "privilege" of organizing a social club and maintaining rooms for that social club, those free citizens must
sacrifice the constitutional rights against such an unreaisonable S<earch and seizure. Neither Amendment IV to
the U. S. Constitution nor Constitution of Utah, Art. I,
Sec. 14, will permit such an absurdity.
Of ,specific importance in this regard is the total lack
of any substantive law in the argument of Salt Lake City
in Point V of its brief. How does it get around the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court
(Camara v. Mwnicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. _172'1,
18 L.Ed . .2d 930) "? Merely by ignoring them.
6

'l'he Camara case, supra, involved attempted inspecti1ous for enforcement of San Francisco's housing codes.
Those city codes permitted just such inspections. Failure
to permit inspections was made an offense.
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to embrace the
Lasic philosophy of search warrants only recently reembraced by this Oourt (State v. Jasso, 439 P2d 844, no
Utah citation) that if the right to privacy must yield to
the right of search it is a matter to be decided by a judicial officer (upon application for a warrant), and not by
a policeman or a government enforcement agent. The
Court further held that administrative searches of the
kind sought in that case were significant intrusions upon
interests protected by the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Cons ti tu ti on.
The i,ssue in the Camara case, supra, wa>S whether the
defendant was occupying a portion of the premises as a
residence when the permit was solely for commercial
occupation. The Court would not require inspection without a warrant, disregarding any question as to whether
or not it was a commercial building or a dwelling.
In this regard, the nature of private social clubs in
Utah becomes important. Such a club is a non-profit
association of various citizens who have some common
interest. In some instances that common interest may be
no more than a desire to have a place in which members
may entertain customers, clients, friends, etc. without resort to permitting consumption of intoxicating liquor
within their own homes. Perhaps Salt Lake City finds it
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inconceivable that some of its citizens might like to
"drink" or to entertain without doing it at home where
their minor children may be exposed to the evils of the
presence of "demon rum".
Nonetheless, those are the brutal facts and many if
not all such club members look upon ''their club'' as an
extension of their living room, family r'oom, recreatioH
room, etc.
This Court took a similar view in State v. Alta Club,
et al., 120 Utah 121, 232 P.:2d 759, when it upheld the right
of members to so ally themselves socially even without
permissive legislation.
The trial Judge in Case No. 11174 took an even more
stern view. On page three of his ''Memorandum Decision'', the Court said: ''I hold that the clubrooms of the
plaintiffs fall into the same category as private dwelling
houses.''
Indeed they are! To the members who use them as
an extension to their living room, etc., indeed they are!
As such, this Plaintiff-Respondent submits, they are
entitled to be kept free fr.om the unreasonable searches '
and seizures by "any peace officer" as contemplated by
the Ordinance. Otherwise, what next in Salt Lake City?
An ordinance that its free citizens must permit the same
type of unwarranted searches and seizures of their homes ,
in exchange for the "privilege" of living in Salt Lake
City?
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Under the philosophy espoused by Counsel for Salt
Lake City, thi,s is not far-fetched.
CONCLUSION
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the rights of
the people of Salt Lake City to be safe from unreasonable
searches and seizures ,should be jealously guarded by this
Court by expressly striking down the provisions Qf 1Seetions 7, 14 and 20 of the Ordinance; and, further, that the
entire Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for
the various reasons set forth her·ein and in the brief on
file herein on behalf of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
OLLIE MeCULLOCH
510 American Oil Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT IN CASE NO. 11174
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